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Abstract
Tax-motivated transfer pricing has attracted world attention owing to the existence of low-tax
jurisdictions and the volume of the activities of multinational corporations (MNCs). MNCs
have many instruments for shifting profits through transfer pricing, and tax havens provide am-
ple opportunity for this. Tax havens pose the threat of capital flight and income shifting from
high-tax countries. At present, there are two ways of tackling this problem: by applying the
arm’s length principle to determine the tax payable by MNCs in a particular jurisdiction or by
using a formula to allocate tax payable by MNCs between countries. Based on various studies
conducted so far, this paper summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of these methods in
solving the problem of profit-shifting by MNCs. The predicament is truly global in nature, and
no single country or group of countries can hope to resolve it. It is high time a global institu-
tion was set up to calculate MNCs’worldwide income and to provide tax authorities with time-
ly information.
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1. Introduction
Tax is the price of civilization. Tax havens are the price of globalization. They are the bulging
pockets of the market economy. The dominant feature of the present wave of globalization is
the global movements of capital and information, both brought about by information technol-
ogy. Mobility of capital, low taxes and secrecy coupled with restriction on the free flow of in-
formation is the reason for the mushrooming of tax havens. Harnessing resources for the com-
mon good is the task of governments, and it is possible only if taxes are collected. Tax base
flight poses a challenge to most nations, irrespective of their stages of development.
Multinational corporations (MNCs) are formidable players on the global landscape. According
to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 2007 World Invest-
ment Report, MNCs account for 10 percent of world Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and one
third of world exports. In 2006 their sales, value added and exports are estimated to have in-
creased by 18, 16 and 12 percent respectively. They are growing faster than the average growth
of the world economy’s GDP. Like any enterprise in business, MNCs want to maximize their
profits. By definition, they have units in more than one tax jurisdiction, and it is estimated that
60 percent of the trade done by multinationals occurs within the group. The prices set for these
internal transfers are not verifiable and are not governed by market principles. This is the great-
est irony of free market economics: a substantial proportion of world trade (that occurring
within MNCs) is not governed by prices set by the market! The price set for a transaction with-
in a business group (controlled transactions), i.e. between the parent company and an affiliate
or between related entities within the business group, is known as the transfer price. Transfer
pricing is one of the most important tax issues faced by MNCs (UNCTAD 1999). ”The prob-
lem addressed by the transfer pricing rules is the absence of market friction in transactions be-
tween controlled persons and the resulting need to verify prices in such transactions for income
tax purposes and, if necessary, to adjust for that absence” (Rosenbloom 2005).
Coupled with the existence of tax havens, these intra-firm transactions provide a façade of le-
gality for the shifting of profit from one jurisdiction to another, low-tax jurisdiction as a nor-
mal course of business events. To illustrate the magnitude of the problem and the ingenuity of
the actors, it suffices to mention here Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation, which has earned
profits of US$ 2.3 billion in Britain since 1987 but has paid no corporation tax there (Econo-
mist 2000). The much discussed tax investigation in February 2008 into the financial affairs of
Klaus Zumwinkel, the then chief executive of Deutsche Post in Germany, clearly shows how
tax-dodging schemes in Liechtenstein, a tax haven, help the tax evaders. The issue of interna-
tional transfer pricing is closely linked to tax havens. MNCs have no incentive to manipulate
transfer prices if both home and host countries have similar tax structures. Apart from the tax
differences between two normal countries, the existence of low-tax jurisdictions, coupled with
mobile capital, complicates the issue of tax compliance.
Options available to countries for preventing tax-motivated transfer pricing are limited in the
globalized world. There is an urgent need to augment policy instruments to keep the tax base
intact and also to create a ’level playing field‘. The objective of this study is to evaluate the
ways and means available to governments to prevent tax-motivated transfer pricing. Juxta-
posed with transfer pricing, tax havens emerge as part of the problem for tax administration.
As transfer pricing is closely linked to low-tax countries, the magnitude and impact of tax
havens is analysed in the second part of this paper. The third part gives an analysis of various
motives for the manipulation of transfer prices, the instruments used by MNCs to carry it out
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and its impact on economies. The fourth part analyses the options available for stopping trans-
fer pricing with income shifting as its objective, focusing on the advantages and disadvantages
of separate accounting and formula apportionment methods. The fifth part briefly examines the
efforts of international tax regimes to plug the loopholes and makes a number of policy rec-
ommendations. The initiatives taken by the G20 are considered. The major policy recommen-
dation is that a multinational agency should eventually be established to calculate the tax bases
of MNCs, with an organization set up in the short run to collect and share actionable informa-
tion on MNC activities across the globe.
2. Opportunities and incentives presented by tax havens
Tax havens present tax evaders with opportunities and incentives. While the definition of a tax
haven varies, the most common features of these territories are low taxes on foreign business
activities and unwillingness to share information with other tax jurisdictions. Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 1998) provides a useful definition of a tax
haven as a jurisdiction that imposes no or only nominal taxes itself and offers itself as a place
for non-residents to escape tax payments in their country of residence.1 On the basis of various
parameters, 59 countries are classified as tax havens (Lorraine / Kudrle 2005; Dharmapala /
Hines Jr. 2007).2 Many of these territories are very small in geographical and population terms.
They have fiscal autonomy even if they are not fully sovereign nations recognized by the Unit-
ed Nations. As they have strong administrations, they offer a guarantee against future rises in
tax rates, expropriation and leakage of information to other tax jurisdictions. The available ev-
idence indicates that tax havens have flourished in the years since 1982 (Hines Jr. 2004).
The existence of tax havens has left other countries with limited options as regards tax rates
and tax regimes. The difference between portfolio investment (PI) and foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) needs to be taken into account while analysing the FDI and taxation. Portfolio cap-
ital is much more mobile than FDI. The treatment of capital gains, the basis on which they are
taxed (accrual or realization) and the tax rates applied (income tax or corporation tax rates or
a different tax rate altogether) are the main differences between countries that give rise to tax
arbitrage opportunities. The complex derivative instruments available in the portfolio invest-
ment market allow investors to arrange their investments in such a way that they are outside
any country’s tax structure. PI is much more volatile and highly sensitive to tax rates
(Schjelderup 2001). Apart from the fear of the flight of portfolio capital, the low-tax jurisdic-
tions have caused tax competition among countries wanting to attract FDI. There is ample em-
pirical evidence to show that countries compete with each other on tax rates (Devereux / Lock-
wood / Redoano 2008). Tax competition is not only harmful to public finance, but also likely
to harm local communities and the environment (Killian 2006). Tax differences cause income
to shift from one country to another. Taking the manufacturing sector as their basis, Bartels-
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mann and Beetsma (2001) have estimated that, at the margin more than 65 percent of the ad-
ditional revenue resulting from a unilateral tax increase is lost because of income shifting even
among countries which are not tax havens. Weichenrieder (2007) has detected profit-shifting
behaviour in MNCs based in Germany. Schwarz et al. (2008) have found that an MNC’s prof-
it shifting within a country depends on a weighted average of international tax rate differences
among all the countries where the MNC is active. Affiliates in countries with low tax rates,
which imply a high tax cost of repatriating earnings, hold more cash than other affiliates of the
same firm (Foley et al. 2007).
2.1 The magnitude of FDI flows to tax havens
Tax havens are an enormous drain on other (non tax haven) countries’ resources. To illustrate
the problem, roughly 30 percent of US Treasury securities are held by some of these tax
havens. The US Treasury’s notes (30 April 2008) in its statistics clarify the buying and selling
of US Treasury bills in tax havens by the residents in the tax havens. The US Treasury clearly
recognizes that tax havens are conduits for the residents of other nations wanting to route their
investments. FDI in tax havens in the Caribbean and South Pacific grew more than fivefold be-
tween 1985 and 1994, to over US$ 200 billion (Morisset / Pirnia 2001).
As Figure 1 shows, tax havens received around 9 percent of total FDI inflows in 2007, down
from 12.5 percent in 2006. Figure 1 also demonstrates that FDI flows to tax havens show a
great deal of variation over time. The greater volatility of FDI flows to tax havens when com-
pared to FDI flows into non-tax havens is mainly due to fewer restrictions on the movement of
Figure 1: Inward FDI flows to tax havens, 2000–2007
Source: UNCTAD (2008)
Note: Tax haven countries were chosen according to Dharmapala / Hines Jr. (2007);
Lorraine / Kudrle (2005). See Appendix for details.
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capital as well as the quality of FDI in these small tax jurisdictions, which may differ substan-
tially from that of other countries.
Calculating the growth of FDI inflows between 1980 and 2007 by using the numbers present-
ed in Figure 2 below indicates that FDI inflows to tax havens grew by 5,472.8 percent, where-
as world FDI inflows to non tax havens (the rest of the world in Figure 2) grew by 3,159.5 per-
cent (UNCTAD 2008).
On the question whether tax havens divert economic activity, evidence evaluated by Desai / Fo-
ley / Hines Jr. (2005) suggests that tax haven activity enhances activity in nearby non-havens.
This would seem to be true, since it is mobile capital which is attracted to these territories, not
investment in real production processes.
2.2 The rationale for tax havens
Tax havens have the backing of some economists, politicians and voices from the general pub-
lic. They are said to help investment and capital formation by encouraging saving and there-
fore constitute a major source of capital in the world. As they are low-tax jurisdictions, they
exert downward pressure on effective tax rates across the globe, because profits can be easily
shifted to them. They are said to help countries to reduce wasteful expenditure on bureaucracy
and ineffective public sectors, because countries cannot find enough resources to finance their
Figure 2: Comparative FDI inflows into tax havens and non tax havens, 1980-2007
Source: UNCTAD (2008)
Note: Tax haven countries were chosen according to Dharmapala / Hines Jr. (2007) and Lorraine / Kudrle
(2005). See Appendix for details.
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wasteful spending. The issue of the good or bad effects that tax has on such mobile factors as
capital and the possibilities of the flight of MNC capital is the subject of many studies e.g. Gor-
don (1986); Bucovetsky / Wilson (1991). Optimum taxation of mobile and immobile firms is
the subject of the investigation conducted by Hong / Smart (2007); Peralta /Wauthy / van Yper-
sele (2004).
A mathematical model constructed by Slemrod / Wilson (2006) demonstrates that the full or
partial elimination of tax havens would improve welfare in non-haven countries, in part be-
cause countries would be induced to increase their tax rates, which they have set at inefficiently
low levels in an attempt to attract mobile capital. But, using a similar model, Hong / Smart
(2007) come to a totally different conclusion. According to their study, while shifting income
to tax havens may reduce the revenues of high-tax jurisdictions and increase tax base elastici-
ty, it tends to make the location of real investment less responsive to tax rate differentials.
In principle, then, the existence of international tax-planning opportunities may allow countries
to maintain or even increase high business tax rates, while preventing an outflow of foreign di-
rect investment. Investment-enhancing effects of international tax-planning may dominate rev-
enue-erosion effects: an increase in international tax avoidance may lead to an increase in both
statutory and effective tax rates on capital, if initial tax rates are not too high, and to an increase
Box 1: Exodus of companies to low-tax jurisdictions: Recent evidence
“The United Kingdom has proposed tightening its anti-avoidance rules by taxing the passive income of
companies with headquarters in the UK. In response to the proposed changes in the tax rates on their
business assets, some big companies have already moved their headquarters from the UK. This recent
movement is unambiguous evidence of the motives of the companies concerned, which have made it
abundantly clear in their statements that they are leaving for tax reasons. Over the last decade, 6 per-
cent of MNCs have relocated partly for tax reasons (Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation).
Companies competing with rivals based in low-tax jurisdictions are under pressure to cut their tax bills.
UBS, the investment bank, predicts a gradual erosion of governments’ ability to tax. Under the UK gov-
ernment plans, non-domiciled foreigners who have been resident for seven years will have the choice of
paying a £ 30,000 fee each year if they want to continue claiming the remittance basis. If they do not pay
the fee, they will pay normal UK tax on their worldwide income and gains. As of today, they do not pay
any tax in the UK unless they bring their earnings into the country. It is reported that the Greek ship-
ping industry is planning to desert London in response to this proposed tax crackdown” (Hope 2008).
“Shire and United Business Media have moved to Ireland from the UK. Kraft, Google, Electronic Arts
and Yahoo have shifted their European head quarters (HQs) from the UK to Switzerland. eBay, Amazon
and Microsoft have moved to Luxembourg. International Power, Wire and Plastic Products plc (WPP),
Astra Zenca and GSK have hinted that they are actively considering the matter. Halliburton has moved
from Houston to Dubai. Experian, Hiscox, Omega and Shell have moved their HQs to low-tax jurisdic-
tions. Nike, Starbucks and Cisco Systems have their HQs in the Netherlands. The Netherlands has also
attracted Ikea from Sweden and Gucci from Italy. DaimlerChrysler based itself in Germany rather than
the US after its merger in 1998 (subsequently unwound) because Germany exempts foreign profits from
taxation” (Houlder 2008).
“Perhaps the most notable account of tax motivated portfolio investments and tax evasion is the Ger-
man attempt to introduce a source tax on interest income in 1994. The first attempt in 1989 failed, since
the German bank secrecy law enabled resident investors to evade taxation by a massive channeling of
funds into Luxemburg. Later efforts by the German government allowed a substantial amount of income
to be tax exempt, effectively sheltering most German households from taxation and making the tax into
a source tax on foreign investors” (Schjelderup 2001).
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in the welfare of citizens of high-tax countries (Hong / Smart 2007).3 This is in direct contrast
to the conventional wisdom of the race to the bottom due to tax competition. Tax havens are
not desirable even on the grounds of equity and the principles of ‘the level playing field’.
Tax havens survive on tax arbitrages and secrecy clauses. The routing activities of MNCs
through tax havens put pressure on the small investors who cannot afford to undertake this kind
of routing. Faced with the threat of capital flight, government policies may be at the mercy of
the MNCs. Thus tax havens provide ample opportunities for tax avoidance and tax evasion. In-
equality of income and wealth is increasing owing to such operations and is having deleterious
effects on society in general (Baker 2005). The loopholes in the taxation system and commer-
cial expediency lead to the black hole of tax havens from which little information is forthcom-
ing to enable tax laws to be enforced in a just and equitable manner.
3. Instruments and loopholes for transfer pricing
Transfer pricing is defined as the pricing of the intermediate products or services supplied by
one or more related entities to other entities within the same group. MNCs have various affil-
iates or branches across countries, each unit being a profit centre. The transaction value of a
good or service between related enterprises may not always reflect market values. Transfer
pricing refers to the distortion between transaction values and market values (OECD 2008).
Trade among MNC affiliates is huge because of the vertical integration of their production
processes. Prices can be set in three ways in such a situation: the headquarters sets the price,
affiliates negotiate with the parent company or related entity and set the price, or the market
price is taken as the price of the goods and services supplied within the group.
3.1 Motivations for transfer pricing
It is important to bear in mind that, while economic activity is highly responsive to taxes, there
are many aspects of behaviour that are difficult to reconcile with such simple microeconomic
incentives as taxes (Gordon / Hines Jr. 2002). Transfer pricing decisions have an impact on ac-
counting, managerial efficiencies, profitability, investment and taxation as well as product and
factor prices.
The motives for transfer pricing manipulation can be broadly classified in four categories:
managerial, market, government policy and taxation.
3 For the reasons why these two models differ in the conclusions they draw, see pages 17 and 18 of Hong /
Smart (2007).
DI09-0350 DP709:Layout 1  04.06.2009  10:46 Uhr  Seite 6
Transfer pricing, tax havens and global governance
German Development Institute 7
Managerial motives:
International transfer pricing may be used as a tool to achieve management objectives with
strategic consequences (Cravens 1997). There is a tension between managerial and tax objec-
tives of transfer pricing when each unit of an MNC is regarded as a profit centre and if mana-
gerial remunerations reflect the profitability of these centres (Göx / Schiller 2006). Even
though the ‘profit centres’ (affiliates or branches) may have a decentralized administrative
structure, the group enterprises as a whole may require a centralized financial strategy to en-
sure efficient coordination of the group’s business. To achieve this, MNCs set the transfer pric-
ing of intra-firm flows of goods, services and other assets centrally, thereby taking control over
pricing policy away from individual profit centres. This may avoid misallocation of resources
and distortion of final prices of the products. In a typical MNC set-up, where some of the costs
are related to product components transferred in from related entities, the decision on prices
has a huge impact on profitability. The cash flow requirement may be easier to fulfil centrally
than locally, and this may distort transfer prices. The high profit figures of a particular sub-
sidiary may lead to a request for a rise in wages by the workers, which may provoke the MNC
to reduce its profits by manipulating transfer prices. MNCs may supply goods and services to
newly established subsidiaries at below normal cost. And if a particular entity lacks liquidity,
then transfer-pricing manipulations will allow for the transfer of funds. To share the costs of
Research and Development (R&D) between various subsidiaries and the parent company in
Box 2: Motives and choices of a typical MNC when the parent company is located
in a low-tax country and affiliate in a high-tax country
The choice before a company is either to produce in the home country and export to the foreign-coun-
try market or to set up a manufacturing unit on foreign soil and supply the foreign market (or the home
market) from it.
Once the company decides to set up a production unit in a foreign country, the kind of production acti-
vity it undertakes may be decided by various conditions prevailing in the home and foreign countries.
Let us assume that the foreign subsidiary (or associate or related party) is producing spare parts used in
the company’s home-country manufacturing process and further that the foreign affiliate of the home
company does not supply these spare parts to anyone else, but exclusively to the home-country parent
company. The question now is how to determine the prices of the spare parts. This is the question ad-
dressed by transfer pricing regulations. If we now also assume that the tax rates in the two countries are
different, with the foreign country, say, having higher rates of corporate tax than the home country, then
the typical ‘profit maximization behaviour’ of the company is expected to be as follows:
Low-tax jurisdiction High-tax jurisdiction
Loan Loan provider Interest payer since it is
deductible from profit
IPR IPR holder Royalty payer
Technical know-how Technical know-how Technical fee payer
Management services Management services provider Management fee payer
Brand Brand holder License fee payer
Repatriation of dividend Retained earnings and
refinancing
Cash Holding high cash balance Holding low cash balance
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different lines, transfer prices may be manipulated even though the R&D concerned is not di-
rectly related to the subsidiary’s product line.
MNCs may be under the pressure from shareholders to show high profitability in a particular
entity. Transfer pricing has further implications in joint ventures, where the local partner in a
joint venture with an MNC may not have the necessary capabilities for checking or under-
standing the MNC’s transfer pricing manipulations. A study byAl Saadon / Das (1996) demon-
strates, that transfer pricing also has implications for the distribution of ownership shares. Rev-
enue will not be allocated fairly between MNC and non-MNC partners if transfer pricing ma-
nipulation occurs. Apart from the above reasons, centralized price-fixing can influence the
worldwide long-term strategies of MNCs.
Market motives:
It is difficult to set an optimum price in such a situation because (a) open market prices for in-
tra-firm transfers may not be available or applicable, (b) profit centres may not be allowed to
purchase inputs from the open market, or they may not be available in the open market, (c)
MNCs use the know-how which is unique to them, (d) skills, the product line and the involve-
ment of intangibles may be such that there are no comparables in the market or a monopoly sit-
uation may obtain in the market, and (e) MNCs may have different entry strategies in a partic-
ular market.
MNCs may be operating in a particular market in the host country where prices are regulated.
If the price set by the regulator is high compared to the cost of production, then the MNC will
benefit if it raises its prices by inflating the input cost applied by the parent company. To cap-
ture a particular market, an MNC may reduce its price by indulging in transfer pricing manip-
ulations.
Motivating government policies:
Specific government economic-policy-related factors going beyond tax-related transfer pricing
considerations may also motivate a MNC to manipulate transfer prices in a manner that affects
the host or home country adversely: concerns about repatriation policies; the extent of the ex-
change risk; asset capitalization policies; anti-monopoly charges; dumping charges; cost-shar-
ing issues; concern about political and policy stabilities. Exchange risks arise when the MNC
has assets and liabilities in foreign currency whose value keeps changing vis-à-vis the home
country’s currency. The change is beneficial to the holder of foreign currency assets if the for-
eign currency is revalued or appreciates vis-à-vis the domestic currency, and an exchange loss
occurs in the opposite case. MNCs would like to gain from future currency fluctuations by ma-
nipulating transfer prices, without waiting for the final repatriation of profits at the end of the
financial/accounting year. To avoid anti-dumping requirements, MNCs may need to raise their
prices. The assessment of the risk of expropriation, business expectations, interest rates etc. is
not necessarily guided by taxes. It may so happen that the political regime is in the process of
change or amending its policies towards business. To avoid the uncertainty of the future, MNCs
may resort to transfer pricing manipulations.
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Tax motives:
Transfer pricing may be used by MNCs as an income-shifting mechanism (Borkowski 1996).
Transfer pricing manipulations are profitable whenever tax rates differ widely between host
and home countries. Countries enter into avoidance agreements to prevent the same profits
from being taxed twice in two tax jurisdictions. Many countries give tax credit for foreign tax
paid by foreign subsidiaries when assessing their global income. And some countries exempt
MNCs from paying taxes on the foreign source of income until the profits are actually remit-
ted to the host country. Compared to corporate taxes as a reason for transfer pricing manipula-
tions, customs duties are much simpler. By lowering the value of imports into a country where
customs duty is high, an MNC gains. In such cases, the host country will not lose any revenue
from customs because the same commodity is not normally subject to export duty in the home
country and import duty in the host country. However, this leads to an increase in the profits of
the subsidiary in such countries. As a rule, customs authorities throughout the world tend to in-
crease the value of imports, whereas income tax authorities reduce the value of inputs. The pol-
icy of host governments towards profit and capital repatriation is also one of the incentives for
transfer pricing manipulations. Countries may impose restrictions on payments of dividends;
they may take the form of a certain percentage of net capital invested, of conditions on the rein-
vestment of profits, of the requirement that the dividends be converted into bonds or a multi-
ple exchange rate system for different transactions. Where stringent restrictions apply, MNCs
will gain by manipulating both trade and non-trade flows. The prices of sales by the parent
company to the subsidiary can be raised or sales from the subsidiary to the parent company un-
Table 1: Motivation for transfer-price manipulations when a parent company sells
to an affiliate abroad
Source: Plasschaert (1994)
Motivation Action by the MNC
1. Corporate profits tax • Underpricing
2. Customs duties
• Imports • Underpricing
• Exports • Underpricing
3. Repatriation of profits or capital • Overpricing
4. Exchange risks
• Claims in strong currency • Overpricing
5. Capitalizing machinery etc. • Overpricing
6. Supporting claims for price increase when • Overpricing
government fixes prices
7. Responding to anti-monopoly charges • Underpricing
8. Responding to dumping charges • Overpricing
9. Mitigating claims for wage increases • Overpricing, to lower reported profits
10. Joint ventures • Overpricing
11. Supporting an “infant” foreign affiliate • Underpricing
12. Enlarging market share through • Underpricing, provided lower costs to
penetration pricing foreign affiliates are reflected in lower
prices to the consumer
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derpriced. In the same way, non-trade payments, such as technical fees, may be overpriced by
the parent company or underpriced if the subsidiary supplies the parent MNC. Tax havens may
also be used for this purpose. The MNC may not purchase from or sell to a subsidiary directly
but through another of its subsidiaries located in a tax haven.
It is important to recognize that, whatever the motivation, once transfer prices differ from real
prices, they have an impact on profitability in either the host or the home country and so affect
tax collection.
3.2 Limitations of transfer pricing
However, an MNC’s manipulation of transfer pricing is subject to various limitations. Transfer
pricing manipulation implies a high level of concentration of decision-making, centralizing
planning and a monitoring system at the MNC’s headquarters, which runs counter to good
management practice in a large MNC. Transfer-pricing manipulation may lead to low profits
or even losses in some subsidiaries, which may be resented at local level. It also requires a large
degree of specialization in pricing, which may in itself be a prohibiting factor for manipulation.
The cost involved in terms of detailed supervision and the complexity of the exercise will pre-
vent manipulation. If the market in which the MNC is operating is a competitive market, it will
not have any additional incentive to engage in transfer pricing manipulation because it may
arouse the suspicion of the regulatory authorities. The frequent changes in corporate taxes, im-
port duties and other variables that reward transfer pricing manipulation deter frequent changes
in prices. The conflict between different transfer-pricing motivations may itself be a deterrent.
For example, high import duties and high corporate taxation compared to another country, ex-
change risks and import duties may have the opposite effect of transfer pricing manipulation.
Conflicting policy regimes within the same jurisdiction or between two countries may preclude
transfer pricing manipulation. In addition to all the above, governments enact legislation espe-
cially to prevent such manipulation.
3.3 Undertaking transfer pricing manipulation
It is presumed, on the basis of various evidence, that MNCs’ affiliates in countries with high-
er tax regimes undercharge for their exports to low-tax countries and overcharge for exports to
high-tax countries. The pre-tax profitability of foreign affiliates correlates negatively with host-
country tax rates (Hines Jr. / Rice 1994). Transfer pricing therefore tends to distort trade mag-
nitudes.
Using data contained in point-of-export customs documents tracking every US international
export transaction between 1993 and 2000, Bernard / Jensen / Schott (2006) find that export
prices for intra-firm transactions of US MNCs are significantly lower than prices for the same
goods sent to an arm’s length customer. After matching related-party sales by a firm to arm’s
length sales by the same firm for the same product exported to the same country in the same
month using the same mode of transport, they find that the average arm’s length price is 43 per-
cent higher than the related-party price. Consistent with incentives to minimize taxation and
import duties, the study finds that the difference between arm’s length and related-party prices
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is negatively associated with destination-country corporate tax rates and positively associated
with destination-country import tariffs. For each percentage point of reduction in the foreign
tax rate they detect a 0.56 to 0.66 percent increase in the price difference. Using monthly data
on intra-firm trade prices between 1997 and 1999 obtained from the US Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics, Clausing (2003) has established that there is substantial evidence of tax-motivated trans-
fer pricing in US intra-firm trade. As this study takes direct account of the actual prices of items
transferred between MNCs’ affiliates/subsidiaries, it is direct evidence of tax-motivated trans-
fer pricing. Demirguc / Huizinga (1998) have found that foreign-owned banks pay lower tax-
es in several developed countries; the taxes they pay tend to fall as the statutory rate rises ow-
ing to transfer pricing manipulation. However, firms can also manipulate ‘transfer prices’ oth-
er than commodity prices, which is the subject of this study. The instruments available for tax-
motivated transfer pricing in the MNCs’ books are various costs incurred by them and their af-
filiates, such as financial costs, the transfer of technology, the cost of shared services, R&D
costs, administrative costs, costs charged for the use of brands and royalties for various IPRs.
The value of these items is rated far more highly in MNCs’ accounts. In addition, MNCs can
so structure their interest and dividend payments that they avoid paying taxes in any jurisdic-
tion.
According to Hines Jr. (2001), the taxation of corporate income encourages entrepreneurs and
managers to structure and conduct their business operations in ways designed to avoid taxes.
Corporations generally reduce their tax obligations, and those of their shareholders, by using
debt rather than equity finance, investing in assets that can be rapidly depreciated for tax pur-
poses and those for which generous tax credits are available, and avoiding dividend payments
or other tax-disadvantaged distributions to investors.
The loopholes in taxation regimes that can be exploited by MNCs to manipulate transfer prices
are also numerous. Accounting standards and disclosure requirements differ from one country
to another. The tax law of each jurisdiction defines in its own way the manner in which corpo-
rations are to calculate their taxable income. Each country has its own incorporation rules and
definition of taxable entities. Withholding taxes, dividend taxes, capital gains taxes and their
adjustments are not uniform across jurisdictions. Tax credit systems too vary from country to
country; as some countries levy tax only when income is repatriated, it is advantageous not to
repatriate profits from tax havens. A variety of entities are taxed unevenly on the basis of their
legal status. They are known as hybrid entities. Nor is the basic principle of taxation the same
in all tax jurisdictions: some adopt the residence principle, others territorial or source princi-
ples.4 These variations are easily exploited by MNCs to their advantage. They can plan their
repatriation strategy in such a way that the least tax is paid in any jurisdiction.
‘Hybrid securities’ are another planning device that can sometimes achieve the same results as
hybrid entities. These are instruments that are regarded as debt by the host country and as eq-
uity by the country to which income payments are made. They exploit the difficulties that tax
authorities have in determining the distinction between tax-deductible debt and taxable equity.
4 Under the exemption (or territorial taxation) system, foreign income taxed in the host country is exempt from
taxation in the parent company’s home country. Hence, profits are taxed only in the country where the sub-
sidiary is located. Under a credit (or worldwide taxation) system, tax liabilities in the subsidiary’s host coun-
try are credited against taxes in the parent country’s home country, although firms are usually permitted to
claim credit for their domestic tax liability only in the case of excess foreign credits.
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These hybrid securities are particularly effective in saving taxes when the receiving country
employs a dividend exemption or ‘territorial’ system, as it is sometimes known. Examples are
the Netherlands, France and Canada, which exempt dividends paid from an active direct in-
vestment abroad. Thus a Canadian company can capitalize an operating subsidiary in the Unit-
ed States with a hybrid security and receive payments that are deductible in the United States,
but exempt at home. Once again, income completely escapes taxation at corporate level.
Hybrid securities can be combined with hybrid entities to ensure a deduction in the paying host
country, no taxation in the receiving foreign country and no taxation in the home country (i.e.
the United States of America) (Altshuler / Grubert 2002). MNCs have layered structures with
complex and far from transparent transactions and normally have holding companies, most of
which are located in tax havens. The problem of enforcement is aggravated by the secrecy shel-
ter provided by the tax havens. A recent study on US MNCs byAltshuler / Grubert (2005) con-
cludes that approximately 40 percent of the growth of intercompany income (in the USA) took
the form of payments deductible in the host country (and presumably not taxable in the re-
ceiving country). They estimated that MNCs saved about US$ 7 billion in taxes in 2002 com-
pared to what they would have paid if they had continued to behave in the same way as in 1997.
This is equivalent to about 4 percent of foreign direct investment income and more than 15 per-
cent of total host country tax burdens.
Furthermore, as part of their investment facilitation measures, governments enter into bilater-
al double taxation avoidance agreements (DTAAs) with their partner countries. These DTAAs
have multiplied over the past ten years or so. There are now 2,651 of them throughout the
world (UNCTAD 2007). The transfer pricing issue is closely related to many aspects of
DTAAs, such as the arm’s length principle, exchange of information, treaty shopping and dis-
pute settlement mechanisms. MNCs have a long list of motives because of their structure and
organization, and there are enough instruments within their operations and gaping loopholes in
tax regimes for them to indulge in income shifting activities through transfer pricing.
4. Tackling the problem: Separate accounting (SA)
(arm’s length prices) vs formula apportionment (FA)
The activities of large MNCs, coupled with governments’ dependence on corporate taxes as a
major source of revenue, make the transfer pricing issue more contemporary and important.
Overzealous tax administrations can cause intermediate product prices to rise (also leading to
double taxation in other tax jurisdictions), and the final price of products may be so distorted
that the benefit of trade and FDI is cancelled out. Internationally accepted transfer pricing reg-
ulation is therefore necessary if tax policy is to be predictable and FDI is not to be discouraged.
It should give investors legal protection. Attempts are being made at multilateral levels to in-
troduce appropriate transfer pricing policies which can sustain and guarantee original invest-
ment decisions. There are two approaches to solving these problems of tax-motivated transfer
pricing; one is separate accounting, which is linked to the principle of the “arm’s length ap-
proach,” and the second is the formula apportionment approach.
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4.1 Separate accounting: Arm’s length principle
The arm’s length principle is in vogue in many countries. In separate accounting (SA) the tax-
able income of MNCs’ affiliates is calculated by each tax jurisdiction as if it were the value of
transactions of independent entities in the market. The international standard that OECD mem-
ber countries have agreed to follow, which is used to determine transfer prices for tax purpos-
es, is set out in Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention as follows: where
“conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their commercial or fi-
nancial relations which differ from those which would be made between independent en-
terprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of
the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included
in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly” (OECD 2001).
This principle governs many bilateral tax treaties.
Paragraph 1.7 of the OECD Guidelines reads:
“There are several reasons why OECD Member countries and other countries have adopt-
ed the arm’s length principle. A major reason is that the arm’s length principle provides
broad parity of tax treatment for MNEs and independent enterprises. Because the arm’s
length principle puts associated and independent enterprises on a more equal footing for
tax purposes, it avoids the creation of tax advantages or disadvantages that would other-
wise distort the relative competitive positions of either type of entity. In so removing these
tax considerations from economic decisions, the arm’s length principle promotes the
growth of international trade and investment” (OECD 2001).
The OECD Guidelines assert that the arm’s length principle should govern the evaluation of
transfer prices among associated enterprises because it is sound in theory since it provides the
closest approximation of the workings of the open market in cases where goods and services
are transferred between associated enterprises. They acknowledge that they may not always be
straightforward to apply in practice; they are meant to produce appropriate levels of income be-
tween members of MNC groups, acceptable to tax administrations (OECD 2001).
This is also known as the separate entity approach because transactions within an MNC group
are separated, each entity being considered an independent entity in the market and its trans-
actions with related entities being treated as if they were unrelated and separate. These trans-
actions are in turn compared to arm’s length transactions in the market which have been ef-
fected in similar circumstances between comparable parties in uncontrolled situations.
The 1995 OECD Guidelines advise on the application of the arm’s length principle. They in-
sist on a comparability analysis, where the issues compared are the types of property or serv-
ice involved in the transaction. The functions performed, risks taken and assets employed
should be similar when comparisons are made. Contractual terms, economic circumstances and
the business strategies of the parties compared need to be understood. This comparability
analysis must take into account the actual transaction that has taken place in the market. The
use of multiple-year data is allowed for comparison purposes. Other factors, such as intention-
al setoffs of various transactions and the impact of government policies on the decision taken
must also be compared and considered. Various transfer pricing methods are used to apply the
arm’s length principle: 1. comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) method, 2. resale price method,
DI09-0350 DP709:Layout 1  04.06.2009  10:46 Uhr  Seite 13
Ganapati Bhat
14 German Development Institute
3. cost plus method, 4. profit split method and 5. transactional net margin method (see OECD
Guidelines for details). Using these methods, tax authorities can modify the declared profits of
any of the enterprises on the basis of this principle.
4.2 Drawbacks of the arm’s length principle
The arm’s length principle suffers from theoretical as well as practical defects. Tax adminis-
trations the world over assess the taxpayer’s income after a lapse of time when a particular
transaction has taken place. The time elapsing between two sets of events may cast a shadow
on the arm’s length price even in comparable cases. The information available for applying the
arm’s length principle may not be adequate.
The intermediate market is assumed to be perfectly competitive in this approach, which means
there are many buyers and sellers of the same goods and services produced by the MNC’s units,
and its upstream or downstream units can buy them in the open market. This is a naïve appli-
cation of the market principle and runs counter to the purpose of MNC activity, which consists
in vertical integration, economies of scale and the exercise of IPRs that generate synergy of
profit. These form the raison d’être of MNCs.5 Moller / Scharf (2002) have shown that, a non-
cooperative equilibrium between tax jurisdictions is characterized by an above-optimum level
of effective taxation. Harmonization of transfer pricing rules leads to Pareto improvement, but
the arm’s length principle – the form of harmonization advocated by the OECD – may not be
Pareto-improving.
In fact, there are many practical problems making it an extremely difficult principle to imple-
ment in reality. The profit split method is akin to formula apportionment, but very rarely ap-
plied owing to the jurisdictional problem and the lack of details on MNCs’ global activities
available to the tax authority of a particular tax jurisdiction. All four methods (comparable un-
controlled price method, resale price method, cost plus method, transactional net margin
method) prescribed by the OECD hinge on the comparability analysis. If really comparable un-
controlled prices exist in the market, no MNC will ever resort to transfer pricing manipulation.
In the absence of direct comparison, the other three methods attempt to compare entities at the
gross profit or net profit margin levels by making various adjustments, which leaves much to
be desired.
The entire dispute in transfer pricing auditing is about the right cases for comparison. Trans-
actions within the group are unique in nature, with no parallels in the outside world. One ex-
ample is the issue of intangibles held by the group. Transactions within the group may concern
the buying or leasing of these intangibles within the group, even when the market potential is
not fully understood, explored or exploited, because of the certainty that the intangibles will be
protected within the group. This can never happen between two independent, unrelated parties
5 The principle that transfer prices should equal market prices or at least be derived from market prices if they
exist is one of the most fundamental rules for transfer pricing. It is not only the theoretical basis of the arm’s
length principle constituted in the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax
Administrations (OECD 2001), but also strongly recommended as best practice in all major managerial ac-
counting textbooks. For the theoretical debate on transfer pricing between units of a single firm see Göx /
Schiller (2006).
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in the market. In fact, the greatest challenge facing the tax authorities is the valuation of intan-
gibles and royalty payments between related parties. Documentation and its presentation to tax
authorities entails a huge compliance cost. It is difficult to prove, after a lapse of time, that a
transaction that has taken place was in fact effected at arm’s length. Comparable cases may not
exist in reality, leading to approximation, which will distort the prices set for adjustment, since,
in any uncontrolled transaction, many factors influencing decisions cannot be explained ra-
tionally. The availability of information needed to make a rational choice, the time available
for decision-making, subjective market assessment and patience, or its absence, are some of the
real-life factors in the market. There are no comparable situations even between two uncon-
trolled transactions. Information asymmetry is a major issue, and neither tax authorities nor
taxpayers can use hindsight to justify a transaction that has already occurred. It is not clear pre-
cisely when in a business transaction the arm’s length principle should be applied or whether
it is to be applied to both parties (controlled entities, i.e. the MNC and its subsidiary) or to on-
ly one. It also has to be decided what kind of adjustment is required for the interplay of gov-
ernment rules and regulations, which may distinguish between controlled transactions and un-
controlled transactions. Quantifying the risk taken and suggesting a suitable adjustment form a
further challenge. Making adjustments to the MNC’s market strategy is also highly con-
tentious.
The best illustration of the issue is probably the US Tax Court’s decision in Bausch & Lomb,
which concerned a US taxpayer who had licensed valuable technology to its wholly owned
(and newly formed) Irish subsidiary and then bought back the subsidiary’s products for distri-
bution in the United States. The production could have been undertaken by the US parent com-
pany at a cost of US$ 1.50 per unit. As a result of the transactions between the US parent and
its Irish subsidiary, the parent paid approximately US$ 6 per unit – US$ 7.50 for the product
purchased less a 20 percent royalty for the subsidiary’s use of the intangible asset. The US gov-
ernment observed that no business enterprise in its right mind would pay substantially more for
goods than the cost it would incur in making them itself. The court concluded otherwise, de-
ciding in favour of the taxpayer, because it applied the arm’s length principle only to the be-
haviour of Irish subsidiary and after production had started (Rosenbloom 2005). This exem-
plifies the problem of precisely when and by whom the arm’s length principle must be applied.
It also reveals how apparently incorrect business decisions can be justified when the arm’s
length principle is applied. The jurisprudence in transfer pricing cases is still in its infancy
since it is relatively new law. Owing to the nebulous nature of business transactions and the in-
herent problems of finding comparable cases, the taxpayer in the USA prefers to settle disputes
with the tax authorities at a mutually agreeable price, which also explains the limited amount
of case-law on this subject. Many countries have introduced rules in this decade, following the
USAwhich has these rules in their statutes for a long time, and the problem of tax adjustments
is just emerging.
The arm’s length principle thus sounds attractive, but in reality, even in the best of situations,
adjustments based on the arms length principle result in a poor approximation. It can lead to
serious double taxation if the tax authorities in two jurisdictions do not agree on the price to be
charged. In fact, two tax jurisdictional authorities are unlikely to agree once one of them has
increased the taxable income of the MNC, because the taxpayer will ask for a corresponding
reduction in the other jurisdiction, causing a loss of revenue for the first. In such a situation,
the dispute between the taxpayer and the tax authority in one country will spill over into the
other and become a bilateral dispute. Dispute settlement procedures, for which all bilateral tax
treaties provide, are administratively costly and time-consuming. An alternative solution there-
fore needs to be found to stop the revenue leakage due to transfer pricing.
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4.3 Formula apportionment (FA)
The formula apportionment (FA) approach disregards controlled transactions as inherently un-
reliable and instead applies a formula to the combined profit made or loss incurred by com-
monly controlled persons (MNCs) as a result of dealings with unrelated persons. The aim is to
work with objectively verifiable results and to assign an appropriate portion of those results to
each of the controlled persons contributing to them (Rosenbloom 2005).
The rationale of the formula approach is that the MNC functions as one entity and has adopt-
ed the goal of maximizing global profit. All its entities are created by the MNC artificially to
suit local laws or for other purposes. It is therefore logical to treat them as a single global en-
tity. The formula will have weights of relative activity measures in each tax jurisdiction. Un-
der this system there will theoretically be no transfer pricing to a low-tax country because the
global profit of the corporation is taken as the tax base. If all countries agree to the formula and
harmonize their tax laws and accounting standards, there will be no chance of double taxation
(Nielsen / Raimondos-Møller/ Schjelderup (2001).
4.4 The advantage of FA
The advantage of the formula apportionment approach is that it is expected to reduce the com-
pliance cost to the taxpayer as well as to the tax administration, since the formula is fixed and
certain. It assumes that all countries will have the same accounting standard and there will no
longer be any need to comply with different tax and company law systems anywhere in the FA
union. It would obviate the need for ‘correct transfer prices’ within a group operating within
the FA union. It would mean that, as tax bases would be consolidated, a loss in one unit could
be offset against the profit of another unit in another country within the FA union. Cross-bor-
der mergers and acquisitions would be facilitated by closer coordination in respect of capital
gains tax within the FA union. It is expected to be closest to market reality in that the unique
nature of an MNC as a whole will be captured by this approach, since the contribution of each
part of its operations cannot in fact be determined and captured. The USA and Canada have
adopted an FA system for the allocation of income across states. FA, as used in the USA, re-
gards the proportion of a multi-regional firm’s income earned in a given state as a weighted av-
erage of the proportion of the firm’s total sales, property and payroll in that state. Thus, as the
firm’s activities in a specific region are approximated by the share of these factors in the re-
gion, the firm is not required to keep different accounts (Pinto 2007).
Doubts are expressed about the advantages of changing to formula apportionment. Nielsen /
Raimondos-Møller / Schjelderup (2001) have concluded on the basis of a theoretical model
that the choice between formula apportionment and a separate accounting system is not very
clear and that it is not certain the problem faced by today’s separate accounting can be elimi-
nated by switching to formula apportionment. But Riedel / Runkel (2007) have concluded that
in a three-country model, where two countries form an FA union while a third country sticks
to SA practice (many previous studies failed to capture the interaction between the two systems
in their models) in the short run, for given taxes, the transition from SA to FA is likely to re-
duce the shifting of profits from the FA union to non-FA tax havens.
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Even in the long run the negative externality of FA is likely to be outweighed by the profit-
shifting externality had there been no FA union. The study conducted by Kind / Midelfart /
Schjelderup (2005) has shown that a reduction in trade barriers lowers equilibrium corporate
taxes under SA, but leads to higher taxes under FA. In a study conducted within the USA,
Goolsbee / Maydew (2000) have found that the apportionment formula has a significant real
effect on a state’s economy. In the context of the USA, the impact of the introduction of FA in
other countries is likely to reduce US taxable income, and some degree of double taxation is
expected, depending on the weight attached to sales. However, the impact of this on any sin-
gle MNC could be significant (Devine / O’Clock / Sceaton 2006).
4.5 Requirements for FA
FA requires significant international coordination among the countries where a particular MNC
has operations. Agreement on a single mathematical formula, using various data sets, such as
input costs, payroll, sales and capital employed, to name a few, is difficult to achieve in the ab-
sence of an agreed uniform accounting standard in the world. Each country would like to have
what is for it the most favourable weighting of factors in the formula. This may become im-
possible to handle politically. Apart from affecting the resources of the exchequer, taxation be-
ing one of the most visible symbols of sovereignty, countries would have difficulty in giving
up the power to tax. How should an MNC group be defined for the consolidation of its global
profit? Should the legal approach or the economic approach be adopted?
Legally, incorporation rules enable some entities to be classified as group entities, but such
ownership definitions can be very hard to determine, especially when the entities are located
outside an FA union. Such other issues as the use of exchange rates and the accounting year al-
so need to be agreed by the countries concerned. Compliance costs may not in fact be low be-
cause the taxpayer has to present global transaction details to various jurisdictional tax author-
ities. Even the tax authorities have to invest a great deal of time, manpower and resources in
auditing these massive transactions spanning the entire globe. In the absence of common ac-
counting standards, the valuation of tangible as well as intangible assets will pose a serious
problem. The FA method may not ultimately capture market reality because the specific ad-
vantages or disadvantages of locations of MNC activities across countries will not be covered
once the group as a whole is considered for tax purposes. It will work only if all countries agree
to the formula. Otherwise, it will lead to serious double taxation. A single country cannot ap-
ply FA because of the size and volume of the transactions involved. Even if only one country
in the group is omitted, the only alternative left will be the arm’s length approach with that
country. How is the law to be enforced in cases where a substantial proportion of an MNC’s
activity is conducted outside the tax jurisdictions of the FA union? What happens when the en-
tities of the MNC group within the FA union suffer losses and entities outside the union earn
profits? Will countries be generous enough to share profits in the reverse situation? All these
political and legal issues need attention before the FA approach is adopted. With multiple na-
tional jurisdictions legitimately seeking a slice of the cake, no one formula can command uni-
versal respect. That way lies disharmony, as each claimant develops an approach based on its
own situation and perceptions (Rosenbloom 2005).
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The major advantages and disadvantages of both the two approaches are summarized in
Table 2 below.
Both of these approaches thus suffer from serious disadvantages, which may exasperate both
the taxpayer and the tax collector.
Table 2: Comparisons of the SA and FA approaches
Arm’s length principle Formula apportionment
Advantages
Disadvantages
1. Each country can use its power to de-
termine taxable income and protect its
tax base.
2. Sounds like a good principle that con-
siders real market condition to set
prices.
3. Already being applied in many coun-
tries and is therefore familiar to the tax-
payer.
4. Obviates the need for tax harmoniza-
tion efforts.
1. Closer to the market reality of an
MNC’s operations since it treats it as a
single entity.
2. No possibility of profit shifting since it
considers the real activity of the MNC
as a whole when apportioning the tax
base.
3. Reduces compliance costs.
4. Opportunity to offset losses of one unit
against profits in another jurisdiction.
1. Based on an unrealistic assumption of
perfect competetion in the intermediate
product market.
2. To compensate for this assumption, it
suggests making adjustments to the im-
perfections, which leads to distortions
and litigation.
3. Comparable cases and situations are
very rare. By its very nature, MNC ac-
tivity seeks to internalize, economize
on scale and use IPRs. Real compare-
ables may not therefore exist, leading
to the above comment on unrealistic
adjustments.
4. When and by whom the arm’s length
principle is to be applied is not clear or
may lead to indeterminate solutions.
5. Existing tax law or evidence fails in
these cases because the adjustment
made to taxable income is at best an ap-
proximation and may not pass the test
of “proof beyond doubt.”
6. Apart from leading to double taxation,
serious bilateral disputes may occur if
each tax jurisdiction wants to save its
tax base.
1. Requires significant coordination and
cooperation between countries on a
particular apportionment formula,
which is hard to imagine happening in
near future.
2. Each country would like to have the
most favourable weighting in the for-
mula, which leads to dissatisfaction.
3. Definition and legal treatment of an
“MNC group” can create further oppor-
tunities for tax planning.
4. Use of exchange rates and accounting
standards needs to be agreed upon by
countries.
5. Even if some countries are left out of
the FA union, the problem with the
countries omitted remains.
6. FA disregards the specific locational
advantages and disadvantages of MNC
affiliates, while capturing global prof-
its.
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5. International coordination efforts
Transfer pricing issues are economic, and it is impossible to legislate for all eventualities. The
strict rules of evidence and existing legislation cannot cope with transfer pricing issues effec-
tively when disputes come to court. Advance pricing agreements or out-of-court settlements
may at least raise eyebrows, if not give rise to a suspicion of corruption. Consequently, there
are many failures; the market principle as applied in the arm’s length approach is naïve, ad-
justments lead to litigation or distortions and possibly double taxation, jurisprudence and glob-
al formula apportionments have not evolved.
5.1 Policy options
Countries can respond to the problems of transfer pricing in four ways: they can try to solve
them alone, by modifying their own tax codes; secondly, they can compete on tax rates and in-
centives, which is harmful; thirdly, they can cooperate, which is not effective with cooperation
in its present form; and the last option is the reassignment of policy-making authority upward,
and the stage is set for such action.
Individual countries are endeavouring to combat the harmful effects of tax havens. In its hunt
for tax evaders who have stashed money away abroad, the US government is using a frequently
forgotten law enacted in 1970. Under this law, citizens or residents must inform the Internal
Revenue Service each year if they have any foreign bank or financial account holdings equiv-
alent to more than US$ 10,000. The US Senate is investigating US nationals using offshore
shell companies to avoid taxes (Browning 2008). This merely highlights the endemic nature of
the problem.
Important though transfer pricing issues are for tax bases and tax collection, many developing
countries do not have an administrative and legal framework to govern transfer price practices
(UNCTAD 2000). Considerable efforts are being made by governments to harmonize the rules
on international taxation. Tax harmonization is expected to be a more efficient way of reduc-
ing tax evasion by MNCs (Blocha / Lefebvre 1999). It is also expected to improve aggregate
social welfare (Elitzur / Mintz 1996). The OECD constantly emphasizes the harmful effects of
tax havens. In 2000 it published the names of thirty-five countries, blacklisting them as ’unco-
operative tax havens’. Some tax havens have at least signed commitment letters, agreeing to
cooperate with other governments and committing themselves to transparency and effective
exchange of information on tax matters. The policy of naming and shaming tax havens has
brought a certain amount of pressure to bear on these jurisdictions. High standards of trans-
parency and exchange of information are also strongly supported by international organiza-
tions, including the G8, the G20 and the European Union (OECD 2007).
Schjelderup (2001) feels that the EU agreement on information exchange is unlikely to work.
His scepticism is due to the absence of an institution that can effectively ensure an exchange
of honest information and to the strong commercial incentives for tax havens to conceal either
transactions or the identity of taxpayers. Even if an information exchange system were partly
successful in that it led to the closure of some tax havens, the benefits to those remaining would
rise substantially, thus presenting them with a very strong incentive not to comply.
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However, according to Gregory Rawlings (2007), the OECD approach of ‘responsive regula-
tion’ (rather than penalization and coercion by the OECD) may eventually have the opposite
effect to that intended, where the enforcement peak of the regulatory pyramid is absent. This
has resulted in the strengthening of the sovereignty of these tax havens and an increase rather
than a reduction in international tax competition. About half of all tax havens have quasi-out-
sider status because they are linked to an OECD member country as a former colony, depend-
ency or possession, by free association or under a double taxation treaty. For example, Aruba
and the Netherlands Antilles are linked to the Netherlands. Most Caribbean islands still have
tax treaties with the United Kingdom.
Other tax havens are islands off the coast of OECD member countries (e.g. the Channel Is-
lands).6 The umbilical cords linking them to developed countries have made tax havens less
cooperative with smaller and less developed countries. The European Union is also actively
propagating tax harmonization, with the Commission working through the EU Joint Transfer
Pricing Forum. The Pacific Association of Tax Administrators is another such organization, its
members being Japan, Australia, Canada and the USA. It meets once a year to exchange in-
formation and identify specific deterrents to tax evasion activities that can be implemented
quickly (Borkowski 2008). The multilateral approach to this problem has not been uniform.
Such regional groupings as ASEAN have considered tax issues. Studies in these areas suggest
that international agreements have the potential to improve the efficiency of tax systems world-
wide (Gordon / Hines Jr. 2002).
5.2 Obstacles and limitations in current regimes
Plugging the holes caused by tax-related transfer pricing poses theoretical as well as practical
problems. As mentioned earlier, many countries do not have any transfer-pricing-related regu-
lations. International coordination is tortuous and time-consuming. Even developed countries
do not have strong penal measures on their statute books to deter tax-motivated transfer pric-
ing. As many of the offshore centres are closely associated with major powers, it seems im-
possible to take coercive action against them if they fail to meet transparency and information
exchange requirements. Disclosure norms should have teeth and be uniform across countries,
so that MNCs come forward with information voluntarily. The possibility of information being
exchanged discourages tax avoidance and evasion. Efforts are needed to enforce existing reg-
ulations with rigour so that precious resources are not lost to tax havens. Although several mul-
tilateral agreements include clauses on incentives and investment rules, their coverage remains
limited. For instance, the World Trade Organization (WTO) regulates FDI incentives in its
agreements on subsidies and countervailing measures (SCMs) and trade-related investment
measures (TRIMS), but these agreements leave a great deal to the discretion of national deci-
sion-makers and apply only to ‘specific subsidies’ directed to individual enterprises (Blom-
ström / Kokko 2003).
The EU’s attempt to bring about an FA union is, at best, a half-measure. As discussed earlier,
even if small numbers of countries in which MNCs are operating are left out of this FA union,
the problem of transfer pricing will persist. The mutual agreement procedures for which tax
6 For a detailed discussion of the status of these tax havens see Lorraine / Kudrle (2005).
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treaties provide are bilateral and highly time-consuming. Corporate social responsibility is an-
other area of concern that needs to be addressed at multilateral level as a matter of urgency. It
should rank higher on the agenda for the WTO negotiations, and the possibility of transfer pric-
ing issues being covered by the negotiations at some stage should be considered.
5.3 Towards an international effort
In the present phase of the world economic crisis, generated by the inventions of opaque fi-
nancial instruments which obscure the nature of obligations, the focus is again shifting to the
institutional setups which can protect the health of the world economy.
The annual Group of Eight summit originated in 1975 as a meeting of six industrial democra-
cies to chart their economic and social futures during the first energy crisis (Canada was added
in 1976, Russia in 1998). How to restore these institutions to their original purpose (primarily
to issues affecting the long-term health of the global economy, including enabling societies that
have been left behind to participate in global growth) is the concern of many such statesmen
as Henry Kissinger. He suggests the inclusion of India, China and potentially Brazil in this
process (Kissinger 2008).
The Washington statement of 25 September 1999 issued by the G7 Finance Ministers and Cen-
tral Bank Governors declared:
“We are deeply concerned there has been growth in illicit international financial transac-
tions, including money laundering, broad scale tax evasion, and other financial crimes. We
will therefore ensure that our experts on such matters will coordinate and actively seek to
contribute to ongoing efforts to address these problems through mutually reinforcing ini-
tiatives within the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Organization for Econom-
ic Cooperation and Development (OECD)”.
The aim and focus was “to protect the international financial system against criminal pro-
ceeds” (G7 1999). It should be borne in mind that tax crimes are not “criminal” in many coun-
tries. This was pointed out at the time when the G20 was established.
The main motivation for launching a new international group was the crisis in emerging
economies which had begun in Thailand in mid-1997 and which widened and intensified
through the next two years, affecting other important Asian economies, before spreading to
Russia and Latin America. The birth of the G20 also reflected the “tectonic” shifts in the glob-
al economy over the previous 20 years, shifts that continue today. While it had been possible
for the major industrial countries to address most global economic problems among themselves
– through the G5 or subsequently the G7 – during the 1970s, and even, to a large extent, dur-
ing the 1980s, it had become increasingly difficult by the late 1990s, as the weight of the G7
countries in the global economy declined, owing largely to the rapid growth of emerging
economies, especially those in Asia (G20 2008). The direction taken by the G20 as regards the
exchange of information seems to be limited to the statement of 21 November 2004.
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However, it is progress in the sense that the declaration refers not only to “criminal” offences
but also to civil offences. The statement in itself is laudable because it clearly recognizes the
need of the hour:
“Financial systems must respect commercial confidentiality, but confidentiality should not
be allowed to foster illicit activity. Lack of access to information in the tax field has sig-
nificant adverse effects. It allows some to escape tax that is legally due and is unfair to cit-
izens that comply with the tax laws. It distorts international investment decisions which
should be based on legitimate commercial considerations rather than the circumvention of
tax laws. The G20 therefore regards it as a mark of good international citizenship for coun-
tries to eliminate practices that restrict or frustrate the ability of another country to en-
force its chosen system of taxation.”
Box 3: The Group of Twenty
There seems to be a great deal of confusion in the minds of general readers about the country grouping,
since a similar grouping exists at the WTO negotiating level. The Group of Twenty (G20) Finance Min-
isters and Central Bank Governors was established in 1999. The G20 is an informal forum that promotes
open and constructive discussion between industrial and emerging-market countries on key issues relat-
ed to global economic stability. By contributing to the strengthening of the international financial archi-
tecture and providing opportunities for dialogue on national policies, international cooperation and in-
ternational financial institutions, the G20 helps to support growth and development across the globe. The
G20 was created as a response both to the financial crises of the late 1990s and to a growing recognition
that key emerging-market countries were not adequately included in the core of global economic dis-
cussion and governance. Prior to the G20’s creation, similar groupings for promoting dialogue and
analysis had been established on the initiative of the G7. The G22 met in Washington D.C. in April and
October 1998. Its aim was to involve non-G7 countries in the resolution of global aspects of the finan-
cial crisis then affecting emerging-market countries. Two subsequent meetings comprising a larger group
of participants (G33) held in March and April 1999 discussed reforms of the global economy and the in-
ternational financial system. The proposals made by the G22 and the G33 for the reduction of the world
economy’s susceptibility to crises showed the potential benefits of a regular international consultative
forum embracing the emerging-market countries. Such a regular dialogue with a constant set of partners
was institutionalized by the creation of the G20 in 1999. The members of the G20 are the finance min-
isters and central bank governors of 19 countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France,
Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea,
Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The European Union is also a member,
represented by the rotating Council presidency and the European Central Bank. To ensure that global
economic fora and institutions work together, the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the President of the World Bank, plus the chairs of the International Monetary and Financial
Committee and Development Committee of the IMF and World Bank, also attend G20 meetings on an
ex-officio basis.
The G20 thus brings together important industrial and emerging-market countries from all regions of the
world. Together, member countries represent around 90 percent of global gross national product, 80 per-
cent of world trade (including EU intra-trade) and two thirds of the world’s population. The G20’s eco-
nomic weight and broad membership gives it a high degree of legitimacy and influence over the man-
agement of the global economy and financial system.
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Apart from calling on all countries to adopt the high standard set by the OECD Model Agree-
ment on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters, the statement recognizes the importance of
information from banks and other financial institutions:
“High standards of transparency require that governmental authorities have access to
bank information and other financial information held by financial intermediaries and to
beneficial ownership information regarding the ownership of all types of entities. High
standards of exchange of information require that such information be available for ex-
change with other countries in civil and criminal tax matters. Exchange of information
in tax matters should not be limited by dual incrimination principles in criminal tax mat-
ters or by the lack of domestic tax interest in civil tax matters. There must be appropriate
safeguards on the use and disclosure of any exchanged information. Exchange of infor-
mation should therefore be implemented through legal mechanisms providing for the use
of such information only for authorized tax purposes, thus ensuring the protection of tax-
payers’ rights and the confidentiality of tax information. (…) The G20 therefore strongly
support the efforts of the OECD Global Forum on Taxation to promote high standards of
transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes and to provide a cooperative
forum in which all countries can work towards the establishment of a level playing field
based on these standards” (G20 2004, emphasis added).
This declaration recognizes the need for a long-term solution and for institutional support. But
hardly any attempt has been made to create such an institutional framework; nor, indeed, has
it attracted much interest. The present focus of the G20 seems to be on measures to combat the
financing of terrorism.
6. Concluding remarks and recommendations
Three principles underlie the international tax regime: the international equity principle – de-
termining which jurisdiction has the right to tax, the international neutrality principle – ensur-
ing that the international tax system does not distort private decisions, and the taxpayer equity
principle – ensuring that taxpayers are treated fairly by the tax authorities (as quoted in Lor-
raine / Kudrle 2005). Double taxation treaties are negotiated on the basis of these principles.
As mentioned above, there were some 5,500 international investment agreements (2,573 bilat-
eral investment treaties and 2,651 double taxation treaties) at the end of 2006, and the numbers
continue to rise. There are 241 free trade agreements and economic cooperation agreements
containing investment provisions (UNCTAD 2007). The periodic negotiation of such treaties,
their ratification at national level and their administration impose an enormous burden on na-
tions. Quantification of the costs involved is difficult. An overarching agreement, giving na-
tional governments sufficient policy space, seems more cost-effective.
The main obstacle to coordination through delegation at international level is, of course, the
absence of global institutional structures (Wildasin 2002). A global agency7 could calculate the
7 Morisset / Pirnia (2001) see the global agency as an issue for the future: “Today, those areas offer more ques-
tions than answers, but it has to be recognized that a global approach is increasingly needed because nation-
al boundaries are fading away, and national tax administrations are losing their control over taxpayers”.
Wildasin (2002, 25) analyses the historical developments, but does not come up with concrete suggestions
for setting up a global agency.
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profit of a multinational company worldwide and then allocate it to an individual country on
the basis of a formula that reflected the firm’s presence in that country. Countries could have
their choice of tax rates and incentives, but the MNCs’ tax base could be determined by the
global agency, in a transparent manner, and allocated rationally and effectively. This agency
could be modelled along the lines of an international criminal court or tribunal with a clear
mandate based on a multilateral treaty. Once such a body had established its credibility, and the
advantages were known, countries would join, and it would have the long-term benefit of pro-
moting global integration. It should have representatives of the countries concerned (where the
transactions are taking place) when cases are taken up, and the formula of apportionment of the
tax base should be negotiated and changeable at certain intervals. At present, there is no mul-
tilateral forum where these issues can be legally settled. The creation of such an agency may
go a long way to achieving a “level playing field” in international business and global gover-
nance as well as helping to mitigate the huge administrative cost to both governments and tax-
payers. Realistically, such an agency for the calculation of MNCs’ tax base or the conclusion
of an agreement is unlikely in the medium term.
Information asymmetry is visible between governments and the MNCs. It is more acute in the
developing world. MNCs employ advisors who have the reach and networks across the globe
to guide them in planning their taxes. Governments have no such agency to detect tax losses.
The need for such an agency is illustrated by the German tax investigation into the affairs of
banks located in Liechtenstein, which were providing shelter for tax evaders. Germany ob-
tained details of the tax dodgers on a computer disk provided by an informant, which contained
information not only on German nationals but also on other nationals. The German government
has offered to share the information with other governments (Benoit / Wiesmann 2008). If there
was an agency that could collect such information regularly, the problem of tax evasion by in-
dividuals as well as corporations could be kept in check. Pending the creation of an entity to
apportion MNCs’ global incomes, there might be, in the short run, an entity like Interpol, with
the power to collect information across borders and having reliable data bases. It should have
operational independence and wide representation of the participating countries if it is to be
credible and reliable. A flow of information on the activities of tax evaders could work won-
ders. The existing bilateral exchange of information is clearly not working because of the sheer
volume of data involved. It is a burden on the administration and can be frustratingly slow. Cur-
rent agencies, like Interpol itself, cannot handle this kind of tax issue because it is a specialized
area needing expertise in a different set of skills. Any possibility of detection increases the cost
of tax evasion. An independent multinational agency for collecting and sharing information
will benefit all tax administrations, and its establishment should be considered in an appropri-
ate forum, such as the G20, at the earliest opportunity.
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Appendix 1
Tax havens
Source: Dharmapala / Hines.Jr ( 2007); Eden Lorraine / Robert T Kudrle (2005)
Country or territory Affiliation
1 Andorra Co-principality between France and Spain
2 Anguilla UK overseas territory
3 Antigua and Barbuda Independent, Commonwealth member
4 Aruba # Part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
5 Bahamas Independent, Commonwealth member
6 Bahrain Independent
7 Barbados Independent, Commonwealth member
8 Belize Independent, Commonwealth member
9 Bermuda UK overseas territory
10 British Virgin Islands UK overseas territory
11 Canary Is #* Autonomous community within Spain
12 Cayman Islands UK overseas territory
13 Channel Islands UK overseas territory
14 Cook Islands Free association with New Zealand
15 Costa Rica Independent
16 Cyprus Independent, Commonwealth member
17 Djibouti #* Independent
18 Dominica Independent, Commonwealth member
19 Gibraltar UK overseas territory
20 Grenada Independent, Commonwealth member
21 Hong Kong * Special administrative region of China
22 Ireland * OECD member
23 Isle of Man British crown dependency
24 Jersey #* Independent
25 Jordan * Independent
26 Labuan #* Federal territory of Malaysia
27 Lebanon * Independent
28 Liberia Independent
29 Liechtenstein Independent
30 Luxembourg * OECD member
31 Macao * Special administrative region of China
32 Madeira #* Autonomous region of Portugal
33 Maldives Independent, Commonwealth member
34 Malta Independent, Commonwealth member
35 Marshall Islands Independent, free association with USA
36 Mauritius # Independent, Commonwealth member
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Appendix 1 (continued)
Tax havens
Source: Dharmapala / Hines.Jr ( 2007); Eden Lorraine / Robert T Kudrle (2005)
Country or territory Affiliation
37 Monaco Independent
38 Montserrat UK overseas territory
39 Nauru # Independent, Commonwealth member
40 Netherlands Antilles Part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
41 Niue # Free association with New Zealand
42 Panama Independent
43 Puerto Rico #* USA possession.
44 Saint Kitts and Nevis Independent, Commonwealth member
45 Saint Lucia Independent, Commonwealth member
46 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Independent, Commonwealth member
47 Samoa (Western) #* Independent, Commonwealth member
48 San Marino # Independent, Commonwealth member
49 Seychelles # Independent, Commonwealth member
50 Singapore * Independent, Commonwealth member
51 Soloman Islands #* Independent, Commonwealth member
52 Switzerland * OECD member
53 Tonga # Independent, Commonwealth member
54 Tunisia #* Independent
55 Turks and Caicos Islands UK overseas territory
56 United Arab Emirates #* Independent
57 Uruguary #* Independent
58 Vanautu #* Independent, Commonwealth member
59 Virgin Islands (US) # US overseas territory
# Not on the Hines-Rice list of tax havens
* Not on the OECD (2000) list
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Appendix 2
Foreign holdings of US securities, by country and type of security, for the major investing
countries in the USA, as at 30 June 2007 (billions of dollars)
a Excluding Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, which are included eported separately.
b Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates.
Report on Foreign Holdings of U.S. Securities at End-June 2007 (US Treasury, 30 April 2008)
Country or category Total Equities Long- term Short-
debt term
debt
ABS Other
Japan 1,197 220 133 768 76
China (Mainland)a 922 29 217 653 23
United Kingdom 921 421 160 316 24
Cayman Islands 740 279 236 186 38
Luxembourg 703 235 104 320 44
Canada 475 347 23 83 22
Belgium 396 25 56 313 3
Ireland 342 81 75 101 85
Switzerland 329 174 41 99 15
Netherlands 321 185 64 59 13
Middle East Oil Exportersb 308 139 18 107 44
Germany 266 100 51 105 11
Bermuda 238 90 53 80 15
France 221 132 36 48 6
Singapore 175 108 13 52 3
Australia 165 87 8 62 9
Russia 148 0 0 109 39
Korea, South 138 5 13 105 15
Hong Kong 138 31 24 75 9
Taiwan 121 11 27 80 3
Norway 109 56 26 22 5
British Virgin Islands 108 67 2 32 7
Mexico 107 19 2 74 13
Brazil 106 1 0 103 2
Sweden 99 60 4 32 4
Country unknown 214 0 1 211 2
Total 9,772 3,130 1,472 4,535 635
of which: Official 2,823 266 280 2,021 256
Rest of the world 762 228 87 342 106
Low-tax countries 2898 1246 588 910 154
Holding of low-tax countries
in percent 0.30 0.40 0.40 0.20 0.24
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